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Abstract 
 The protection of child victims and witnesses in the criminal 
justice system is of vital importance, as present-day research 
studies conducted on the victimisation of children in South Africa 
show that South African children in particular experience and 
witness exceptionally high levels of crime, and consequently 
represent a significant portion of the victims and witnesses that 
have to appear in court to testify about these crimes. This 
contribution consists of an in-depth discussion of the rights of 
the child victim and witness encompassed in the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 in order to determine whether 
the current protection afforded to child victims and witnesses 
while testifying in criminal proceedings in South Africa is in line 
with South Africa's constitutional obligations. In this regard the 
general constitutional rights in the Bill of Rights relating to child 
victims and witnesses as well as the specific constitutional rights 
of child victims and witnesses in section 28 of the Constitution 
are discussed. 
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 1 Introduction 
Children's rights in South Africa have undergone a significant change since 
1994. This can be attributed inter alia to the enactment of a democratic 
Constitutional legal order, as the principles encompassed in both the Interim 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1 and later the final Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) enhance the level of 
protection afforded to children in South Africa.2 This also applies to the rights 
of child victims and child witnesses3 in the criminal justice system. 
Conversely, present-day research studies conducted on the victimisation of 
children in South Africa show that South African children in particular 
experience and witness exceptionally high levels of crime. The incidence of 
child rape and sexual assault upon minors, for example, has reached 
epidemic proportions.4 Disturbingly, these studies also indicate a trend 
                                            
1  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
2  Other aspects include South Africa's ratification and adoption of principal 
international instruments protecting the rights of children. See for example the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (hereinafter referred to as the 
CRC), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (1980) and the 
United Nations Guidelines on Justice in Matters Involving Child Victims and 
Witnesses of Crime (2005). Due to the limited scope of this paper, this will not be 
addressed here. 
3  In terms of s 28(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) a child means a person under the age of 
18 years. DOJ&CD Service Charter for Victims of Crime (hereinafter referred to as 
the Victims' Charter) defines a "victim" as a person who has suffered harm, including 
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial 
impairment of his or her fundamental rights through acts or omissions that are in 
violation of our criminal law. "Victims" include, where appropriate, the immediate 
family or dependants of the direct victim. A person may be considered a victim 
regardless of whether the perpetrator has been identified, apprehended, prosecuted 
or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between perpetrator and 
victim. "Victim" includes everyone, without prejudice of any kind on the grounds of 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
For the purposes of this study the concept of victim/complainant encompasses the 
term witness and the terms will be used interchangeably. It is acknowledged, 
however, that not all witnesses are direct victims of crime, but may be defined in 
terms of the above-mentioned definition as such, owing to the fact that they were 
witnesses to a crime and thus suffered emotional or mental harm. This definition is 
in line with the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims 
of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985). It is of significant importance to understand 
who would be regarded as a victim, as this informs who has standing to seek 
protection, support and redress. 
4  Paula Barnard, the national director of World Vision South Africa, speaking during 
National Child Protection Week in May 2017, stated that "Violence against children 
has reached epidemic proportions and like any other disease, be it HIV/Aids or 
Ebola, it should be treated as a national disaster and remedied accordingly" (Seeth 
2017 https://city-press.news24.com/News/violence-against-children-a-national-
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towards a decrease in the age of these victims, while the use of brute force 
directed against them is escalating.5 Population-based prevalence studies 
show that the most common forms of violence against children reported in 
South Africa are physical and sexual violence in the home and community.6 
In the event that the offenders are apprehended, these child victims and 
witnesses have to undergo the daunting experience of appearing in court to 
face the perpetrators. Statistics indicate that a growing number of the 
victims and witnesses who have to appear in court to testify about these 
crimes are therefore children.7 
Owing to their particular vulnerability, the protection of child victims and child 
witnesses in the criminal justice system is thus of vital importance. The 
purpose of this discussion of South Africa's constitutional obligations is to 
determine whether the current protection afforded to child victims and child 
witnesses while testifying in criminal proceedings in South Africa is in line 
with South Africa's constitutional obligations. Strong emphasis will therefore 
                                            
disaster-20170529). A national prevalence study published in 2016 provides some 
data relating to the prevalence of violence against children. This study estimates that 
34% of the country's children are the victims of sexual violence and physical abuse 
before they reach the age of 18 (Artz et al 2016 
http://www.cjcp.org.za/uploads/2/7/8/4/27845461/08_cjcp_report_2016_d.pdf).The 
SAPS crime stats for 2017-2018 indicate that murder rates increased during this year 
quite significantly, shooting up 7% to over 20 000 cases recorded. The number of 
reported rapes in South Africa also increased to 40,035 cases in the same year. 
Unfortunately, although certain categories such as homicide and sexual assault are 
routinely reported, the statistics were not disaggregated for children in 2017/2018, 
as had been done in 2011/2012 (Crime Stats SA 2018 
http://www.crimestatssa.com/national.php). 
5 The Democratic Alliance (DA) Zakhele Mbhele, DA Shadow Minister of Police, said 
in a media statement on 16 May 2018 that children had been the victims of a 
shocking 41% of all 124,526 rape cases reported in the past three financial years in 
South Africa, and a parliamentary reply also revealed that in the same period more 
than 2 600 children were murdered, which constitutes 5% of all reported murders. 
Mbhele furthermore said that this also means that at least 46 children are raped 
every day and at least 2 children are murdered every single day in South Africa. 
Alarmingly only 21% of child rapes cases and only 1 in 3 murder cases resulted in 
successful convictions, he said. (See SAPeople 2018 
https://www.sapeople.com/2018/05/16/children-are-victims-of-almost-half-of-all-
rapes-cases-in-south-africa-46-raped-2-murdered-daily/.) 
6  DSD, DWCPD and UNICEF Violence against Children 3; Jamieson, Sambu and 
Matthews Out of Harm's Way? reported that 56% of the children in Mpumalanga and 
the Western Cape reported a lifetime prevalence of physical abuse by caregivers, 
teachers or relatives. 
7  Artz et al 2016 
http://www.cjcp.org.za/uploads/2/7/8/4/27845461/08_cjcp_report_2016_d.pdf. A 
report by Fang et al indicated that the estimated economic value of disability-
adjusted life years lost owing to violence against children in 2015 amounted to R196 
billion, or 4.9% of South Africa's GDP in 2015 (Fang et al 2016 
https://www.savethechildren.org.za/sci-za/files/47/47ab7077-1d0d-4c37-8ae2-
161b18ae427a.pdf). 
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be placed on the constitutional obligations relating to the protection of child 
victims and child witnesses while testifying in criminal proceedings. 
The South African Constitution incorporates an extensive Bill of Rights 
which has been internationally acclaimed as a good example of a 
Constitution that provides for the advancement and protection of children's 
rights.8 In this regard the Bill of Rights includes a special section or children's 
clause, namely section 28, which affords specific protection to children.9 In 
so doing, the Constitution recognises that children are particularly 
vulnerable to violations of their rights and are in need of unique and distinct 
protection. Section 28 gives effect to the recognition of this vulnerability and 
embodies a dedicated commitment to the realisation of children's rights.10 
Children are also included under "all people" in South Africa. They are thus 
afforded all the rights in the Bill of Rights11 except for those rights that are 
expressly restricted to adults, such as the right to vote and to seek public 
office.12 The rights in the Bill of Rights are repeated in section 28 to some 
degree. These rights therefore provide the context for the rights contained 
                                            
8  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 327. 
9  Section 28 of the Constitution provides as follows: 
1) Every child has the right— 
(a) to a name and a nationality from birth; 
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when 
removed from the family environment; 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services; 
(d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; 
(e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices; 
(f) not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that— 
(i) are inappropriate for a person of that child's age; or 
(ii) place at risk the child's well-being, education, physical or mental health or 
spiritual, moral or social development;  
(g) not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition 
to the rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained 
only for the shortest appropriate period of time, and has the right to be— 
(i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and 
(ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the child's 
age; 
(h) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state 
expense, in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would 
otherwise result; and 
(i) not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed 
conflict. 
(2) A child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child. 
(3) In this section "child" means a person under the age of 18 years. 
10  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional Protection of Children" 177. 
11  Section 7(1) of the Constitution. Also see Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2014 2 SA 168 (CC) para 38. 
12  Section 19(3)(a) and (b). Also see Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development 2014 2 SA 168 (CC) para 38. 
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in section 28.13 Children are not only protected in general as "persons or 
people" in the Bill of Rights but are also specifically protected in terms of 
section 28.14 
In order to throw light on the impact of the Bill of Rights on child victims and 
child witnesses in the criminal justice system, a general overview of the 
constitutional rights in the Bill of Rights relating to child victims and child 
witnesses will be given, whereafter the specific constitutional rights of child 
victims and child witnesses in section 28 of the Bill of Rights will be 
discussed. 
2 The rights in the Bill of Rights as they relate to child 
victims and child witnesses within the criminal justice 
system 
The Bill of Rights enshrines the fundamental rights of all people in South 
Africa.15 These rights are not mere guidelines; on the contrary the State is 
obliged "to respect, promote and fulfil" these rights. The Bill of Rights places 
an unambiguous obligation on the State with regard to the promotion, 
protection and realisation of children's rights.16 These include the rights to 
equality;17 dignity;18 life;19 freedom and security of the person;20 individual 
autonomy construed from the rights to privacy;21 freedom of religion;22 
freedom of expression;23 freedom of association;24 property;25 housing;26 
health care services; food, water and social security;27 education;28 just 
administrative action;29 and the rights of arrested, detained and accused 
persons to a range of protections.30 The rights that are the most important 
                                            
13  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional Protection of Children" 178. 
14  Friedman, Pantazis and Skelton "Children's Rights" 47-1; Skelton "Constitutional 
Protection of Children's Rights" 342. 
15  Section 7(2) of the Constitution. Also see Bekink and Brand "Constitutional 
Protection of Children" 173 and Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 
2005 1 SA 509 (T), where the court held at 528D that ss 10, 12(2)(a) and (b), 14 and 
27(1)(a) of the Constitution apply to everyone. 
16  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 14. 
17  Section 9 of the Constitution. 
18  Section 10 of the Constitution. 
19  Section 11 of the Constitution. 
20  Section 12 of the Constitution. 
21  Section 14 of the Constitution. 
22  Section 15 of the Constitution. 
23  Section 16 of the Constitution. 
24  Section 17 of the Constitution. 
25  Section 25 of the Constitution. 
26  Section 26 of the Constitution. 
27  Section 27 of the Constitution. 
28  Section 29 of the Constitution. 
29  Section 33 of the Constitution. 
30  Section 35 of the Constitution. 
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or have the most significant impact on the child victim and child witness are 
the rights to equality, human dignity, freedom and security of the person 
(specifically the right to be free from all forms of violence) and the right to 
individual autonomy (specifically the right to privacy and freedom of 
expression). These rights are discussed separately below. 
2.1 The rights to equality, human dignity, and freedom and security 
of the person 
Section 9 of the Constitution affords everyone the right to equality, and 
section 9(1) guarantees the right to equality before the law and equal 
protection and benefit of the law. Section 9(3) and 9(4) describes how this 
equality should be realised, namely by prohibiting unfair discrimination by 
the state and by private entities on a non-exclusive list of grounds. One of 
the grounds listed in section 9(3) is "age". The effect of this is that any 
distinction between children and others based on their age will be 
scrutinised in terms of the Constitution to determine whether it complies with 
the prohibition on unfair discrimination.31 In Christian Lawyers Association 
v Minister of Health32 the High Court considered age as a ground for 
discrimination. In the case in question the applicants challenged the validity 
of the provisions of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act,33 on the 
ground that girls under the age of 18 years should not be able to choose to 
terminate their pregnancies without parental consent as they were not 
capable of making the decision alone. The court rejected this challenge and 
concluded that the Act made informed consent, and not age, the basis for 
its regulation of access to termination of pregnancy. Mojapelo J emphasised 
that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection 
and benefit of the law and that any distinction between women on the 
ground of age would infringe these rights.34 
The Constitutional Court has developed a detailed test to be followed when 
confronted with claims of unfair discrimination. This test assists the court in 
its decision on whether the state or a private party has unfairly discriminated 
against any person. The test was first set out in Harksen v Lane.35 In 
                                            
31  Bekink and Brand "Constitutional Protection of Children" 178; Albertyn and Goldblatt 
"Equality" 35-69. 
32  Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (T). 
33  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
34  Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 1 SA 509 (T) 528E. 
35  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 54. It should be noted that although the 
test was developed under the Interim Constitution it has been followed under the 
Final Constitution. See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 15. The Constitutional Court tabulated the test along 
the following lines:  
(a)  Does the challenged law or conduct differentiate between people or 
categories of people? If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection 
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essence, the test entails that a preliminary enquiry must be conducted to 
establish whether the provision or conduct differentiates between people or 
categories of people. This is a threshold test in that if there is no 
differentiation then there can be no question of a violation of section 9(1). If 
a provision or conduct does differentiate between people or categories of 
people, a two-stage analysis must follow. The first stage concerns the 
question whether the differentiation amounts to discrimination. The test here 
is whether the law or conduct has a rational basis. This is the case where 
the differentiation bears a rational relation to a legitimate government 
purpose. If the answer is no, the law or conduct violates section 9(1) and 
fails at the first stage. If, however, the differentiation is shown to be rational 
the second stage of the enquiry is activated, namely whether the 
differentiation, even if it is rational, nevertheless amounts to unfair 
discrimination under section 9(3) or 9(4).36 If the discrimination is on a 
specified ground, it would be presumed to be unfair. If the discrimination 
occurs on an unspecified ground the complainant will have to establish that 
the discrimination was unfair.37 
If the discrimination is found to be unfair a court will proceed to the final 
stage of the enquiry as to whether the provision can be justified under 
                                            
to a legitimate government purpose? If it does not then there is a violation of 
section 9(1). Even if it does bear a rational connection, it might nevertheless 
amount to discrimination. 
(b)  Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two-
stage analysis: 
(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to "discrimination"? If it is on a 
specified ground, then discrimination will have been established. If it is 
not on a specified ground, then whether or not there is discrimination 
will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is based on attributes 
and characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental 
human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely 
in a comparably serious manner. 
(ii) Secondly, if the differentiation amounts to "discrimination", does it 
amount to "unfair discrimination"? If it has been found to have been on 
a specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an 
unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the 
complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of 
the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation. 
If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not 
to be unfair, then there will be no violation of sections 9(3) and 9(4). 
(c)  If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be 
made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations clause. 
36  Ngcukaitobi "Equality" 216. Note, however, that the Constitutional Court held in 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 
(CC) para 18 that this does not mean that in all cases the rational connection enquiry 
of the first stage must inevitably precede the second stage. According to the 
Constitutional Court the rational connection enquiry would clearly be unnecessary in 
a case in which a court holds that the discrimination is unfair and unjustifiable. A 
court need not perform both stages of the enquiry. 
37  Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 35-75. 
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section 36 of the Constitution, the limitation clause.38 This final stage, 
according to the Constitutional Court, "involve[s] a weighing of the purpose 
and effect of the provision in question and a determination as to the 
proportionality thereof in relation to the extent of its infringement of 
equality".39 However, this stage applies to discrimination in terms of law of 
general application only, since it is only such discrimination that can be 
justified under the limitation clause.40 
An evidentiary rule that severely impacts on child victims and child 
witnesses is the cautionary rule in relation to children's testimony. This rule 
stems from the presiding officer’s practice of warning the jury against certain 
kinds of witnesses, notably accomplices, complainants in sexual cases, and 
young witnesses. The cautionary rule originated from the notion that the 
evidence of these witnesses could not safely be relied upon without some 
kind of corroboration in the form of other evidence confirming its 
trustworthiness. This rule differentiates between children and other 
witnesses on the grounds of age.41 
In Director of Public Prosecutions v S42 the court followed the approach of 
S v Jackson43 and, referring to trends in countries such as Canada, Ireland, 
the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, held that the proper 
approach was not to insist on the application of the cautionary rule as though 
it was a matter of rote, but to consider each case on its own merits. Although 
the evidence in a particular case might call for a cautionary approach, this 
was not a general rule. The court stressed that it could not be said that the 
evidence of children, in sexual and other cases, where they were sole 
witnesses, obliged the court to apply the cautionary rules before a conviction 
could take place.44 What was required of the State was to prove the 
accused's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. This might require the court to 
apply the cautionary rule.45 
                                            
38  Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 35-80. 
39  Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) at para 52. 
40  Albertyn and Goldblatt "Equality" 35-81. 
41  Zeffert and Paizes Essential Evidence 308-309. 
42 Director of Public Prosecutions v S 2000 (2) SA 711 (T). 
43 S v Jackson 1998 1 SACR 470 (A). Prior to 1998 the law took the view that the 
cautionary rule as it applies to accomplices had to be applied to the evidence of 
complainants in sexual cases. This rule was abolished by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, however, in S v Jackson 1998 1 SACR 470 (A). 
44 Director of Public Prosecutions v S 2000 2 SA 711 (T) 715A-B. In the case under 
discussion the court a quo applied the cautionary rule in respect of all three aspects, 
namely the evidence of children in sexual cases where they are single witnesses 
(see Director of Public Prosecutions v S 2000 2 SA 711 (T) 715G-H). 
45  Director of Public Prosecutions v S 2000 2 SA 711 (T) 716B-D. 
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Despite what appeared to be the application of a more liberal approach by 
the judiciary, case law suggests otherwise.46 In the case of S v Hanekom47 
the magistrate was criticised for failing to give sufficient weight to the two 
cautionary rules applicable to the case (the complainant was both a single 
witness and a child) and for failing to apply them with the degree of attention 
to detail demanded by the particular circumstances of the case. According 
to Saner AJ the magistrate had merely paid lip service to the cautionary 
rules.48 In evaluating the matter, the court referred to R v Manda49 and S v 
Viveiros,50 stating that because of the potentially unreliable and 
untrustworthy nature of such evidence, it fully intended to heed the warning 
against accepting the evidence of children. According to the judge, the court 
must have proper regard to the danger of an uncritical acceptance of the 
evidence of both a single witness and a child witness.51 In the case of S v 
Haupt52 (the complainant in the case and also the main witness for the state, 
was a fifteen year old girl) the High Court highlighted that as the state had 
relied on the complainant's evidence it was imperative for her testimony to 
be clear and reliable in all material respects.53 The court found that in casu 
this was not the case. The court furthermore stated that the trial court had 
not applied the cautionary rules adequately in evaluating the complainant's 
evidence, thereby constituting a misdirection.54 
It is unsurprising that the rule has its critics. Whitear-Nel55 expresses her 
concern, and justly so, over the fact that the court in the Hanekom case did 
not refer to recent research in the area of child psychology and 
development, which shows that children's ability to give reliable evidence 
has been greatly underestimated.56 Schwikkard likewise points out that the 
trend internationally has been to abolish this cautionary rule.57 She 
furthermore stresses that as the rule is based on discredited beliefs, a 
strong argument can be made that, just as the cautionary rule applicable to 
complainants in sexual cases was found to be irrational and based on 
stereotyped notions and hence abolished, so too should the cautionary rule 
applicable to children be abolished.58 Schwikkard submits, which 
submission is supported by the writer hereof, that in the absence of a clear 
                                            
46  See S v Hanekom 2011 1 SACR 430 (WCC); S v Haupt 2018 1 SACR 12 (GP). 
47  S v Hanekom 2011 1 SACR 430 (WCC). 
48  S v Hanekom 2011 1 SACR 430 (WCC) para 7.  
49  R v Manda 1951 3 SA 158 (A). 
50  S v Viveiros 2000 2 All SA 86 (SCA). 
51  S v Hanekom 2011 1 SACR 430 (WCC) paras 9-10. 
52  S v Haupt 2018 1 SACR 12 (GP). 
53  S v Haupt 2018 1 SACR 12 (GP) para 18. 
54  S v Haupt 2018 1 SACR 12 (GP) para 18. 
55 Whitear-Nel 2011 SACJ 382 at 396. 
56 See Schwikkard "Getting Somewhere Slowly" 79. 
57 Schwikkard "Getting Somewhere Slowly" 79. 
58  Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 154. 
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rationale it becomes difficult to justify the cautionary rule's inconsistency 
with a constitutional commitment to equality.59 
It should be noted that this rule also differentiates between children in sexual 
cases and children in other criminal cases. Section 60 of the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act60 provides that a 
court may not treat the evidence of a complainant in a sexual offence with 
caution on account of the nature of the offence. In S v M61 the court held 
that the approach applied in S v Jackson62 also applied to all cases in which 
an act of a sexual nature was an element, and thus also to the evidence of 
children. 
In the recent case Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis Frankel63 
the Constitutional Court handed down judgment in an application for the 
confirmation of an order of constitutional invalidity made by the High Court. 
The High Court declared section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Act64 to be 
inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it bars, in all 
circumstances, the right to institute a criminal prosecution for all sexual 
offences, other than rape or compelled rape, trafficking persons for sexual 
purposes and using a child or person who is mentally disabled for 
pornographic purposes, after the lapse of a period of 20 years from the time 
when the offence was committed.65 
In a unanimous judgment, the Constitutional Court held that the primary 
rationale for the distinction contemplated in section 18 is the perception that 
certain sexual offences are more serious than others.66 The Constitutional 
Court acknowledged that the survivors of sexual assault face similar 
personal, social and structural impediments when reporting these offences 
and that the harm caused by different sexual offences is significantly similar, 
regardless of whether the harm is the consequence of rape or other forms 
of sexual assault.67 The Constitutional Court furthermore pointed out that 
the effect of section 18 is that it over-emphasises the significance of the 
nature of the offence68 at the expense of the harm it causes to survivors 
thereof, and therefore fails to serve as a mechanism to protect and advance 
                                            
59  Schwikkard 2009 Namibia LJ 14. 
60  Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
61  S v M 1999 2 SACR 548 (SCA) 554-555. 
62  S v Jackson 1998 1 SACR 470 (A). 
63  Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis Frankel 2018 2 SACR 283 (CC). 
64  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter the Criminal Procedure Act). 
65  L v Frankel 2017 2 SACR 257 (GJ). 
66  Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis Frankel 2018 2 SACR 283 (CC) para 
51. 
67  Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis Frankel 2018 2 SACR 283 (CC) paras 
2 and 21. 
68  Own emphasis added. 
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the interests of the survivors.69 In addition it penalises a complainant by 
preventing him or her from pursuing a charge, where the delay is caused by 
his or her inability to act, even though a reasonable explanation may exist 
for the delay.70 Lastly, the Constitutional Court held that section 18 
undermines the state's efforts to comply with international obligations, such 
as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which impose a duty 
on the state to prohibit all gender-based discrimination.71 The Constitutional 
Court consequently confirmed the High Court's order that section 18 is 
irrational and arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional, insofar as it does not 
afford the survivors of sexual assault other than rape or compelled rape the 
right to pursue a charge after the lapse of 20 years from the time the offence 
was committed.72 The Court accordingly suspended the declaration of 
invalidity for a period of 24 months to allow Parliament to cure the 
constitutional defect.73 
In the light of the dictum of Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis 
Frankel74 it is submitted by the writer hereof that to differentiate between the 
application of the cautionary rule with regard to children in sexual cases and 
children in other criminal cases (on the ground of the nature of the offence) 
may likewise be irrational and arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional. In L 
v Frankel75 the High Court with reference to the expert report of Higgings76 
highlighted that to have regard to the frequency and severity of child abuse 
may be more useful in determining the experience of trauma than the 
classification of the type of abuse. The abolition of the cautionary rule as a 
rule of general application thus seems fitting. 
In Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited77 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
inter alia handed down judgment in an application for the confirmation of an 
order of constitutional invalidity made by the High Court. The High Court 
declared section 154(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act to be inconsistent 
with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it fails to confer protection 
                                            
69  Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis Frankel 2018 2 SACR 283 (CC) para 
52. 
70  Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis Frankel 2018 2 SACR 283 (CC) para 
54. 
71  Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis Frankel 2018 2 SACR 283 (CC) para 
60. 
72  Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis Frankel 2018 2 SACR 283 (CC) para 
89. 
73  Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis Frankel 2018 2 SACR 283 (CC) para 
89. 
74  Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis Frankel 2018 2 SACR 283 (CC). 
75  L v Frankel 2017 2 SACR 257 (GJ) para 54. 
76  Higgins 2004 Family Malted 50-55. 
77  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited 2018 2 SACR 696 (SCA). 
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on victims of crime who are under the age of 18 years.78 While section 
154(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act affords anonymity to an accused and 
a witness at criminal proceedings who are under the age of 18 years, similar 
protection is not offered to children under the age of 18 years who are the 
victims of a crime. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal concurred with the High Court and pointed 
out that the purpose of the limitation on the disclosure of any information 
which reveals or may reveal the identity of a victim is twofold. Firstly, as in 
the cases of an accused and a witness under the age of 18 years, to protect 
children who are victims of crime from the glare of publicity at criminal 
proceedings.79 Secondly, to ensure that the section complies with the 
equality provision of section 9 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal accordingly held that the exclusion of child victims from the 
provisions of section 154(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act is irrational and 
in breach of section 9(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees everyone the 
right to equal protection and benefit of the law. The denial of equal protection 
to child victims, who are equally vulnerable, the court pointed out, can 
therefore not be justified.80 Parliament was consequently ordered to remedy 
the constitutional invalidity within 24 months of the date of the order. 
Pending parliament’s remedying the constitutional invalidity, the section is 
deemed to include such protection.81 The aforementioned constitutional 
case is welcomed in so far as it affirms the child victims’ and child witnesses’ 
right to equality. 
It should be kept in mind that equality is a very contentious and intricate 
issue when it comes to children's rights. Skelton points out that as a general 
rule the children's rights sector petitions for the special protection, rather 
than the equality of children. She emphasises, however, that despite this 
call, there is a strong case to be made for the position that children should 
not receive less protection than adults would in the same circumstances.82 
In addition, cognisance should be taken of the fact that children's inequality 
is often the very cause of their need for special protection. Birch comments 
that child abuse occurs in part because of the inequalities between a child 
and an adult in size, knowledge and power, and that these inequalities have 
been institutionalised by one-sided rules of evidence.83 The cross-
examination of child victims and child witnesses during a criminal trail 
serves as an example. For cross-examination to be fair and just the parties 
                                            
78  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited 2018 2 SACR 696 (SCA) para 35; own 
emphasis added. 
79  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited 2018 2 SACR 696 (SCA) para 28. 
80  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited 2018 2 SACR 696 (SCA) para 29. 
81  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited 2018 2 SACR 696 (SCA) para 35. 
82  Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 342. 
83  Birch 1992 Crim LR 269. 
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to the proceedings should have equal standing.84 It goes without saying that, 
when exposed to harsh cross-examination by adults, children are in a 
position unequal to that of the adults and may find it difficult to protect 
themselves. In order to uphold children's right to equality and to ensure an 
equality of outcome, it may therefore be necessary to treat children 
differently from everyone else.85 This type of differentiation is acknowledged 
by section 9(2) of the equality clause, which provides that legislative and 
other measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of 
persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken in order to 
promote equality.86 
It is submitted that the application of section 170A of the Criminal Procedure 
Act,87 which allows for children to be cross-examined by an intermediary, 
could level the playing field in this regard. The introduction of the function of 
an intermediary by the insertion of section 170A(1) into the Criminal 
Procedure Act is one of the more important interventions in respect of the 
protection of child witnesses.88 The South African Law Commission (as it 
was then known) conducted an investigation into the effect of testimony by 
child witnesses in open court in 1989. The Commission came to the 
conclusion that children were severely traumatised by the adversarial 
criminal procedures followed. In an attempt to alleviate the effect of the 
accusatorial system on child witnesses and to avoid direct confrontation 
between a child and an accused, the Commission recommended the 
introduction of the function of an intermediary into the criminal justice 
system.89 
An intermediary is a person specifically qualified to facilitate communication 
between the court and a child in a manner that is not only age-appropriate 
but also understandable to a child. The intermediary takes the child's 
cognitive and developmental abilities into account when conveying the 
meaning and contents of the court's questions to the child and acts as a 
"barrier or shield" between the formal justice system and the child, thus 
                                            
84  SALC Project 73 para 2.11. 
85  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 210-211. 
86  Elphick et al 2014 SAJHR 227. 
87  Section 170A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act determines that "Whenever criminal 
proceedings are pending before any court and it appears to such court that it would 
expose any witness under the biological or mental age of eighteen years to undue 
mental stress or suffering if he or she testifies at such proceedings, the court may, 
subject to subsection (4), appoint a competent person as an intermediary in order to 
enable such witness to give his or her evidence through that intermediary". 
88  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, as amended by the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act 135 of 1991 and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007. 
89  SALC Project 71. 
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ensuring that the child's rights are respected.90 The use of an intermediary 
therefore provides an enabling environment for the child witness and child 
victim to present his or her testimony and should be regarded as an example 
of an equalising measure. 
The right to dignity is enshrined in section 10 of the Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane91 stated as follows: 
The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and 
the source of all other personal rights in chap 3. By committing ourselves to a 
society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value 
these two rights above all others. 
The Constitutional Court further pointed out that the right to dignity is 
intricately linked to other human rights.92 According to the Constitutional 
Court: 
Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of 
human beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect 
and concern. This right therefore is the foundation of many of the other rights 
that are specifically entrenched in chap 3.93 
In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs94 the Constitutional Court further 
elaborated on the importance of this right by stating that "dignity is not only 
a value fundamental to our Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable 
right that must be respected and protected". Currie and De Waal point out 
that although we can be certain of the pivotal importance of human dignity 
in the Constitution, we can be less certain of the meaning of the concept. 
This is because neither the Constitution nor the Constitutional Court has 
ventured to offer a comprehensive definition of human dignity.95 Instead, the 
court has stated, it has "a wide meaning which covers a number of different 
values" and which gives a person "infinite worth".96 
It goes without saying that children are also entitled to the right to dignity. In 
S v Mokoena; S v Phaswane97 Bertelsmann J with reference to Sachs J in 
                                            
90  Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2009 2 SACR 130 (CC) para 96 (hereinafter referred to as DPP v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development). 
91  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 144. 
92  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 328. 
93  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 328. 
94  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 35. 
95  See Woolman "Dignity" 36.2, where he identifies five definitions of dignity in the 
Constitutional Court's jurisprudence. 
96  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 251; Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 
(CC) para 138; S v Dodo 2001 3 SA 382 (CC) para 38. 
97  S v Mokoena; S v Phaswane 2008 2 SACR 216 (T) para 50 (hereinafter referred to 
as S v Mokoena). 
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S v M (Centre for Child Law as amicus curiae)98 pointed out that every child 
has a dignity of his or her own, which entails that a child is to be 
constitutionally regarded as an individual with a distinctive personality and 
not merely as a miniature adult waiting to reach full size. The court 
emphasised that the importance of the right to dignity for the child victim and 
child witness demands the following:99 
At the very least the criminal procedure and the courts should administer the 
criminal justice system in such a fashion that children who are caught up in its 
workings are protected from further trauma and are treated with proper 
respect for their dignity and their unique status as vulnerable young human 
beings. 
This position was reiterated by the Constitutional Court in Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development100 when it held the following: 
Each child must be treated as a unique and valuable human being with his or 
her individual needs, wishes and feelings respected. Children must be treated 
with dignity and compassion. In my view these considerations should also 
inform the principle that the best interest of the child are of paramount 
importance in all matters concerning the child as envisaged in s 28(2) of the 
Constitution. 
In Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development101 the Constitutional Court, in addition to 
reaffirming the importance of dignity in recognising the inherent worth of 
children, emphasised that children's rights to dignity are not dependent on 
the rights of their parents; nor is the exercise of these rights held in 
abeyance until children reach a certain age. 
It is clearly not only important that the child victim and child witness be 
treated with the necessary dignity and compassion, but also essential that 
the child victim and child witness should not be exposed to treatment such 
as demeaning cross-examination while testifying. Once again, the use of an 
intermediary may prove to be invaluable in this regard. 
Section 12 of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom and security 
of the person.102 Of particular importance to the child victim and child 
                                            
98  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 18. 
99  S v Mokoena para 50. 
100  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 79. 
101  Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2014 2 SA 168 (CC) para 52. 
102  Section 12 of the Constitution states that:  
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes 
the right – 
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; 
(b) not to be detained without trial; 
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witness is the right guaranteed in section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution, 
namely the right to be free from violence,103 as well as that guaranteed in 
section 12(1)(e), namely the right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, 
inhuman or degrading way.104 
Although sections 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(e) may normally not be associated 
with court proceedings, it is submitted that it can be argued that exposing a 
child in open court to aggressive cross-examination by the alleged 
perpetrator or legal representative may amount to (secondary) violence or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In support of this argument the 
Constitutional Court in DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development105 acknowledged that a child complainant who relates in open 
court in graphic detail in the presence of the accused the abusive acts 
perpetrated upon him or her will in most instances experience undue stress 
and suffering. This is exacerbated when the child is subjected to intensive 
and at times aggressive cross-examination by the accused or his or her 
legal representative. The Constitutional Court emphasised that cumulatively 
these experiences [this treatment] are often "as traumatic and as damaging 
to the emotional and psychological wellbeing of the child complainant as the 
original abusive act" or may even expose the child to "further trauma, 
possibly as severe as the trauma caused by the crime" itself.106 
Currie and De Waal define violence against an individual as a grave 
invasion of that individual's personal security.107 Bishop and Woolman108 
point out, however, that the violence contemplated in section 12(c) should 
                                            
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; 
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and 
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. 
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes 
the right – 
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) to security in and control over their body; and  
(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their 
informed consent. 
103  Although one may normally not associate court proceedings with violence, 
cognisance should be taken of the fact that General Comment No 13 (GC 13) of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child defines violence as including all forms of 
physical or mental violence, including psychological maltreatment. It calls on all 
States Parties to introduce legislation and other measures to implement the rights of 
children in its guidelines, including treating child victims in a child-friendly and 
sensitive manner. Refer to Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment 
No 13: The Right of the Child to Freedom from All Forms of Violence UN Doc 
CRC/C/GC/13 (2011). 
104 Own emphasis added. 
105  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 108. 
106  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 108. 
107  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 281. 
108  Bishop and Woolman "Freedom and Security of the Person" 40-49. 
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not be narrowly construed as "grave", as this would fail many of the people 
whom the right is meant to protect. In support of their argument they point 
out that women, for example, or men trapped in abusive relationships may 
suffer from psychological as well as physical violence that could probably 
not be successfully categorised as grave but could still entitle them to the 
protection of section 12(1)(c). 
Section 12(1)(c) guarantees the right to be protected against an invasion of 
an individual's personal security, whether by the state or by private 
individuals. It therefore places an obligation on the state to protect 
individuals both negatively by itself refraining from such invasion and 
positively by restraining or discouraging private individuals from any 
invasion.109 
With specific reference to the child victim and child witness, Bertelsmann J 
in S v Mokoena110 emphasised that "foundational to the enjoyment of the 
right to childhood is the promotion of the right as far as possible to live in a 
secure and nurturing environment free from violence, fear and avoidable 
trauma."111 Judge Bertelsmann pointed out that both individually and 
collectively all children have the right to: 
… express themselves as independent social beings, to have their own 
laughter as well as sorrow, to play, imagine and explore in their own way, to 
themselves get to understand their own bodies, minds and emotions, and 
above all to learn as they grow how they should conduct themselves and make 
choices in the wide social and moral world of adulthood.112 
He furthermore stressed that, although no constitutional injunction can in 
and of itself isolate children from the shocks and peril of harsh family and 
neighbourhood environments, the law can create conditions that protect 
children from abuse. The state should create positive conditions for 
recovery to take place and diligently seek to avoid conduct by its agencies 
that has the effect of placing children in peril.113 
It can be argued that this means that the State has an obligation to protect 
children from further trauma; to develop conditions for the child to testify in 
a child-friendly environment conducive to recovery, and to refrain from 
placing the child in further peril by for example requiring the child to testify 
in the sight of an alleged perpetrator. It is precisely this secondary trauma 
                                            
109  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 282; Bishop and Woolman "Freedom 
and Security of the Person" 40-49, 40-54. 
110  S v Mokoena para 19. 
111  S v Mokoena para 19. 
112  S v Mokoena para 19. 
113  S v Mokoena para 20. 
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that section 170A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act seeks to prevent,114 and 
accordingly the application of section 170A(1) could play an invaluable role 
in fulfilling this obligation. 
2.2 The right to individual autonomy 
Like everyone else, children are entitled to the rights to privacy,115 freedom 
of religion,116 freedom of expression117 and freedom of association.118 Of 
particular importance to the child victim and child witness is the right to 
privacy and the right to freedom of expression. 
Section 14 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to 
privacy, which includes the right not to have their persons, property or 
homes searched, their possessions seized or the privacy of their 
communications infringed. This right in the Bill of Rights closely relates to 
the common-law personality right to privacy, which forms part of a person's 
dignitas.119 Neethling et al, in confirmation of the importance of the right to 
privacy, point out that a lack of privacy may negate the whole physical 
disposition of a person.120 A breach of a person's right to privacy may occur 
in two ways, namely when there is an unlawful intrusion of a person's 
personal privacy (for example where electronic equipment is used to 
eavesdrop on a private conversation) or an unlawful disclosure of private 
facts about a person (for example where a doctor relates his patient's ills to 
friends).121 This infringement must be subjectively contrary to the person's 
will and must also be objectively contrary to the contemporary boni mores 
and the general sense of justice of the community, as perceived by the 
courts.122 
The importance of protecting the privacy of the child victim and child witness 
in criminal proceedings is recognised by our law, in that sections 153 and 
154 of the Criminal Procedure Act respectively make provision for children 
to testify "in camera" and prohibit the publication of information which might 
reveal the identity of the complainant or the witness at such criminal 
                                            
114  S v Mokoena para 108. 
115  Section 14 of the Constitution. 
116  Section 15 of the Constitution. 
117  Section 16 of the Constitution. 
118  Section 17 of the Constitution. 
119  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 296. 
120  Neethling et al Law of Personality 29. 
121  Prinsloo v Bramley Children's Home 2005 5 SA 119 (T); Neethling et al Law of 
Personality 33. 
122  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 296. 
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proceedings.123 In S v Mokoena124 Bertelsmann J describes the rationale 
for the protection of the privacy of the child victim and witnesses while 
testifying in criminal proceedings as follows: 
Vulnerable witnesses must be protected from public exposure, either because 
disclosure of their identity may endanger their life or limb or because the sense 
of embarrassment and discomfort at having to testify before an audience, 
particularly concerning traumatic and sexually sensitive events, may expose 
the witness to emotional and psychological harm. 
The need to protect such a child victim and child witness from possible harm 
therefore warrants the court's excluding the public or certain members of 
the public from attending the hearing and from revealing the identity of the 
child witness to the public.125 
The child victim's right to privacy was examined by the court in Prinsloo v 
Bramley Children's Home.126 The applicants in the case were facing criminal 
charges for indecent assault and the possession of child pornography. The 
applicants launched a civil application for an order granting them access to 
the personal files, held by the Bramley Children's Home, of the two minor 
complainants in the criminal case. The applicants were suggesting that the 
children might have been involved in previous sexual misbehaviour or other 
improper conduct. They hoped to discover facts or suggestions in the 
children's personal files that might enable them, inter alia, to confront the 
minors during cross-examination with innuendos or allegations of 
misbehaviour of this nature.127 
As to the merits of the application for access to the information, the court 
noted that there was no suggestion that the applicants had any knowledge 
that any such impropriety had occurred in the past and that they had 
intended to launch a dragnet operation to uncover anything of this nature to 
discredit the complainants' characters.128 The court furthermore stated that 
the information being sought was of a very personal nature and it was clear 
                                            
123  Note that the High Court in Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited 2017 2 SACR 
416 (GP) paras 53-58 ruled that s 154(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act must be read 
with s 153(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act and s 63(5) of the Child Justice Act 75 
of 2008, thereby affording protection to child victims, witnesses, the accused, and 
offenders.  
124  S v Mokoena para 101. 
125  See for example Prinsloo v Bramley Children's Home 2005 5 SA 119 (T), where the 
applicants cited the minors individually and by name. The court held at 123C-D that 
the minors could be seriously harmed if they were identified regardless of the 
outcome of the application. The court accordingly ordered at 123I that the minors 
were not to be identified by the media or anybody else, by name or otherwise, either 
directly or indirectly. 
126  Prinsloo v Bramley Children's Home 2005 5 SA 119 (T). 
127  Prinsloo v Bramley Children's Home 2005 5 SA 119 (T) 123D-E. 
128  Prinsloo v Bramley Children's Home 2005 5 SA 119 (T) 123E-H. 
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that the mere launching of such an application, even if nothing relevant was 
found in the personal files, might cause the children considerable distress. 
The children's involvement in the criminal trial would be traumatic in itself 
without their having to face the additional prospect of an attack of this 
nature’s being launched upon their credibility, morals and probity.129 
The court stressed that it was of paramount importance that the children's 
interests should be safeguarded by the court and that to allow access to the 
information would result in the infringement and limitation of the rights of the 
children and in particular their right to privacy, to emotional and 
psychological integrity, and to dignity.130 
The court therefore resolved that the applicants bore the onus of proving to 
the court that their right to a fair trial justified the limitation of the children's 
aforementioned rights. The court held that in order to succeed with such an 
application, the applicants had to persuade the court, on a balance of 
probabilities, that it was essential for the preparation of their defence to have 
access to the information.131 In this instance the applicants had chosen not 
to disclose the nature of their defence and had failed to show any basis for 
the relief sought; instead, the grounds presented by them were "vague, 
superficial and unsupported by factual allegations". The application was 
accordingly dismissed.132 It is submitted that unless very strong factual 
grounds are presented, the application of the best interests of the child 
criteria will prevent any limitation of the child's right to privacy. 
Children’s right to privacy also played a significant role in another leading 
decision of the Constitutional Court, namely Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused 
Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.133 The case 
concerned an application for the confirmation of a ruling by the High Court 
that certain provisions of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related 
Matters) Amendment Act134 relating to the criminalisation of consensual 
sexual conduct with children of a certain age were unconstitutional and 
accordingly invalid.135 
It is important to note that in considering the matter the Constitutional Court 
emphasised from the outset that the case was not about whether children 
should or should not engage in sexual conduct, nor was it about whether 
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Parliament may set a minimum age for consensual sexual conduct. Rather 
it dealt with the question whether it was constitutionally permissible for 
children to be subjected to criminal sanction in order to deter early sexual 
intimacy and to combat the risks associated therewith.136 
The main question before the Constitutional Court was whether the 
impugned sections were inconsistent with the Constitution insofar as they 
limited adolescents' fundamental rights.137 The court found that sections 15 
and 16 of the Sexual Offences Act did in fact constitute an encroachment 
on adolescents' rights and specifically their rights to human dignity (section 
10) and privacy (section 14), and the principle of the best interests of the 
child (section 28(2)), as set out in the Constitution.138 The court also found 
that these limitations were not reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 
36 of the Constitution.139 
In considering whether the impugned sections infringed adolescents' right 
to privacy the Constitutional Court referred to National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,140 where it was held as follows: 
Privacy recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and 
autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships 
without interference from the outside community. The way in which we give 
expression to our sexuality is at the core of this area of private intimacy. If, in 
expressing our sexuality, we act consensually and without harming one 
another, invasion of that precinct will be a breach of our privacy. 
The Constitutional Court held that the principled basis of reasoning followed 
in the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 
applied with equal force to the consensual sexual conduct of adolescents.141 
This was due to the fact that the criminal offences under sections 15 and 16 
of the Sexual Offences Act apply to the most intimate sphere of personal 
relationships and inevitably involve adolescents' constitutional right to 
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privacy.142 The offences allow police officers, prosecutors and judicial 
officers to scrutinise and assume control of the intimate relationships of 
adolescents, thereby intruding into the personal realm of their lives. This 
intrusion, the court pointed out, is exacerbated by the reporting provisions 
set out in section 54, which oblige third parties to disclose information which 
may have been shared with them in the strictest confidence.143 
The Constitutional Court accordingly declared sections 15 and 16 of the 
Sexual Offences Act inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the 
extent that they impose criminal liability on children under the age of sixteen 
years.144 This declaration of invalidity was suspended for a period of 
eighteen months, allowing Parliament to correct the defects in the Sexual 
Offences Act,145 which was subsequently amended by the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act Amendment Act146 
in order inter alia to ensure that children of certain ages are not held 
criminally liable for engaging in consensual sexual acts with one another.147 
The two aforementioned constitutional cases, namely Johncom Media 
Investments Limited v M and Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development are welcomed in that 
they contribute to developing a jurisprudence that recognises children as 
independent rights-holders of fundamental rights such as the right to 
privacy.148 
As explained above, the privacy of the child victim and child witness in 
criminal proceedings is recognised by our law, in that section 154 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act prohibits the publication of information which might 
reveal the identity of the complainant or the witness at such criminal 
proceedings. It should be noted, however, that the protection afforded in 
terms of this section ceases to exist once the child victim or witness attains 
the age of eighteen. In the case of Centre for Child Law v Media 24149 the 
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146  Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act Amendment 
Act 5 of 2015. 
147  See ss 2 and 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act Amendment Act 5 of 2015. 
148  Kruger "Protection of a Child's Right to Privacy" 283. 
149  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 2017 2 SACR 416 (GP). 
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North Gauteng High Court ruled150 that child offenders, victims and 
witnesses may be identified once they turn eighteen years of age. 
Upon appeal of the matter, the Supreme Court of Appeal151 concurred with 
the High Court, namely that the protection afforded by section 154(3) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act to victims and witnesses of crime under the age of 
18 years does not continue to protect such victims and witnesses after they 
turn 18 years.152 The Supreme Court of Appeal like the High Court 
considered the language of the section, stating that the section is 
unambiguous and the interpretation contended by the appellants, whether 
in respect of the victim extension or adult extension, was unduly strained.153 
The appellants submitted that the section had to be interpreted in line with 
what was described as "the principal of ongoing protection".154 The 
appellants argued, which argument is supported by the writer hereof, that 
an interpretation that ensured ongoing protection better promoted section 
28(2) of the Constitution, the "best interest of the child" provision, and 
protected child victims and witnesses from the severe harm of 
identification.155 The Supreme Court of Appeal, however, held that as the 
section is an exception to the open justice rule and by virtue of the fact that 
it carries a criminal sanction, it must be interpreted in favour of individual 
liberty. Furthermore, that the extension of the anonymity protection for 
children conflicts with the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press and other media entrenched in section 16(1)(a) of the Constitution.156 
After conducting the proportionality analysis157 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that in the absence of any limitation on the nature and extent of the 
adult extension, the relief sought by the appellants was overboard and did 
not strike an appropriate balance between the rights and interest involved. 
The proposed limitation on the right of the media to impart information was 
furthermore neither reasonable nor justifiable, in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court of Appeal consequently concluded that 
the constitutional challenge to the provision of section 154(3) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act on this basis must fail.158 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Appeal, upheld the interim order made 
to protect the identity of the victim in the matter, Zephany Nurse, pending 
                                            
150  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 2017 2 SACR 416 (GP) para 67. 
151  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited 2018 2 SACR 696 (SCA). 
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155  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited 2018 2 SACR 696 (SCA) para 10. 
156  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited 2018 2 SACR 696 (SCA) para 14. 
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with claims of unfair discrimination. 
158  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited 2018 2 SACR 696 (SCA) para 27. 
M BEKINK  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  24 
the outcome of any appeals to the Constitutional Court arising from the 
judgment.159 
It is furthermore of value to note that the Supreme Court of Appeal, per 
Swain JA, despite its ruling expressed sympathy with the objective of the 
appellants in seeking to protect the anonymity of children as victims, 
witnesses and offenders of crime, once they reach adulthood. However, 
whether the law requires amendment and if so the nature and extent of such 
an amendment, Swain JA indicated, is a task more appropriately left to the 
Legislature.160 
It is submitted by the writer hereof that an amendment to the law may not 
only be advisable but may be received with wide support. The Minister of 
Justice has already expressed support for an extension to the protection of 
the anonymity of children.161 Such an extension would also be in line with 
the protection afforded to child witnesses in other Commonwealth 
countries.162 Moreover, as highlighted by Willis JA,163 to do otherwise would 
not only violate that person's constitutional right to dignity, but the 
knowledge, as a child, that one's identity as a victim of crime may be 
revealed upon attaining of one's majority, may haunt that child, causing her 
considerable emotional stress. In his opinion, which opinion is supported by 
the writer hereof, it verges on cruelty to sanction torment as such.164 
Section 16 of the Constitution guarantees everyone, including children, the 
right to freedom of expression.165 This includes the freedom of the press 
and media, freedom to receive or impart information and ideas, artistic 
creativity and academic freedom and scientific research. Of particular 
importance to the child witness is the freedom to receive or impart 
information and ideas.166 
Currie and De Waal contend that as section 16(1) protects free expression, 
in principle one could argue that every act by which a person attempts to 
express some emotion, belief or grievance should qualify as 
"expression".167 According to them, the wide, almost unlimited conception 
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166  Section 16(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
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of expression in section 16 means that protection is accorded to many 
problematic forms of speech that would be left out of constitutional 
consideration in other jurisdictions.168 In the context of the child victim and 
child witness, one could accordingly argue that this provision guarantees 
the child witness the right to express himself or herself in a variety of ways, 
including in a non-conventional, novel or creative manner.169 This correlates 
with section 161(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which states that in the 
case of a witness under the age of eighteen years evidence shall be deemed 
to include "demonstrations, gestures or any other form of non-verbal 
expression". 
In addition, child witnesses should be able to express themselves "freely" 
when giving testimony in the criminal justice setting.170 The possibility of 
doing so for children in an adversarial criminal justice system has been 
questioned by professionals and academics.171 Empirical evidence has in 
fact shown that the confrontational setting decreases the child's willingness 
and ability to give an accurate description of the events he or she has to 
testify about. Children are more likely to say "I don't know" or may even 
refrain from answering at all.172 
Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Act recognises the context within 
which a child complainant or child witness has to testify. It accepts that 
testifying in court carries with it a certain degree of mental stress or suffering 
for the child. Its objective is to reduce to the minimum the degree of stress 
experienced by the child and to create an atmosphere that is conducive to 
allowing the child to speak freely about the events relating to the offence 
committed against the child. The provision of an intermediary is intended to 
create this atmosphere for the child.173 One could therefore argue that, in 
order to ensure that a child has full realisation of the right to freedom of 
expression, the presiding officer should give serious consideration to the 
desirability of appointing an intermediary when exercising his discretion on 
whether or not to appoint an intermediary.174 
                                            
168  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 342. 
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stress or suffering if the child testifies at such a proceeding. This test or threshold for 
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3 Section 28: Specific children's rights 
Section 28 of the Bill of Rights175 affords children specific protection such 
as the right to a name and a nationality from birth;176 to family care or 
parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the 
family environment;177 to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or 
degradation;178 as well as the right to have regard to the fact that a child's 
best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the 
child.179 
A perusal of section 28 reveals that the section does not afford the child 
victim and child witness a specific right to protection as a victim or witness. 
Nevertheless, the right not to be subjected to neglect, abuse or degradation 
as set out in section 28(1)(d) as well as the principle that a child's best 
interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child 
are of particular importance to the child victim and child witness. These 
rights will accordingly be discussed in more detail below. 
3.1 The right not to be subjected to neglect, abuse or degradation 
Section 28(1)(d) of the Constitution provides that a child has a right to be 
protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation. This right 
reflects society's belief that children are vulnerable. According to Bekink and 
Brand, section 28(1)(d) imposes a constitutional duty on private persons, as 
well as the State, to refrain from these forms of treatment, and in addition 
imposes a positive obligation on the State to prevent harm to children.180 
The second obligation is of particular importance in two possible instances. 
Firstly, the state is required to put an end to situations of on-going 
maltreatment, neglect, abuse and degradation in the family or any other 
context by means such as removing the child from such a situation.181 This 
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duty is given specific legislative effect in the Children's Act.182 For instance, 
Chapter 7 of the Children's Act provides special measures for reporting 
cases of abuse or neglect of children,183 while Chapter 9 of the Children's 
Act provides the legal machinery to intervene when a child is in need of care 
and protection, such as the removal of the child to temporary safe care.184 
Bekink and Brand point out that, in order to meet this positive constitutional 
duty to intervene in situations of on-going abuse to protect a child, the State 
in many instances acts in conflict with the child's right to family or parental 
care. They argue that this creates the need for a flexible test against which 
to decide whether the decision by the State to intervene in a situation of 
abuse may be constitutionally sound.185 Kruger186 maintains that this 
infringement of the child's right to family or parental care is probably justified 
in terms of the limitation clause in situations of on-going abuse. 
The second context within which the State must act to prevent the neglect, 
abuse, maltreatment and degradation of children is the general context of 
the legislative and policy protection of rights. In this regard the State is under 
a constitutional duty to create legislative and other measures to protect 
children against potential maltreatment, neglect, abuse and degradation. 
Examples of such legislation include the Children's Act187 as well as the 
Sexual Offences Act,188 which introduces a whole range of new offences 
aimed at protecting children from violence. These statutory instruments bear 
witness to an increasing awareness of and concern on the part of the 
legislature for the need to ensure that children are protected against the 
increasing prevalence of violence that is engulfing our society.189 
Of particular consequence to the child victim or child witness are the various 
amendments made by the latter Act to the Criminal Procedure Act to provide 
for special measures for children to testify, such as testifying "in camera"; 
the prohibition of the publication of information that might reveal the identity 
of the child victim or witness, and the use of an intermediary.190 In so doing 
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M BEKINK  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  28 
the legislature has tried to ameliorate, if not eradicate, those aspects of the 
criminal process that tend to expose the child to secondary psychological 
trauma or emotional harm.191 
In S v Mokoena192 Bertelsmann J emphasised that in the light of the 
occurrence of this secondary trauma (the child’s having to give evidence in 
court about his or her experience), it is incumbent upon the criminal law and 
criminal procedure and upon the courts along with their functionaries and 
practitioners to administer the criminal justice system in such a fashion that 
children who are caught up in its workings are protected from further harm 
and are treated with proper respect. Testifying "in camera" as well as the 
appointment of an intermediary goes a long way to ensuring that this right 
not to be subjected to (further) harm or abuse is accomplished.193 This view 
is particularly apposite if one takes into account that the definition of "abuse" 
in the Children's Act is broad and includes the prevention of "exposing or 
subjecting a child to behaviour that may harm the child psychologically or 
emotionally".194 
In DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development195 the 
Constitutional Court acknowledged that for a child witness to testify about 
the details of abusive acts may cause severe harm to the child's 
psychological and emotional wellbeing and may lead to secondary 
traumatisation.196 To subject the child to the normal adversarial process of 
testifying in court may accordingly fall squarely within the definition of abuse 
in the Children's Act. 
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195  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
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The Constitutional Court has dealt with the right (among others) not to be 
subjected to maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation in two cases 
dealing with the corporal punishment of children in public settings.197 
Although the two cases were brought on grounds that included the right to 
be protected against maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation as 
stipulated in section 28(1)(d), the court did not make any significant 
pronouncements on the meaning of the subsection in either of the two 
judgments.198 
In S v Williams199 the court declared the section of the Criminal Procedure 
Act that allowed for the corporal punishment of juvenile delinquents to be 
invalid, owing to its being a violation of the right to be protected from cruel 
and degrading punishment. The court unfortunately did not find it necessary 
to examine the right in any detail. 
The second case, Christian Education SA v Minister of Education,200 was 
decided after the promulgation of the South African Schools Act,201 which 
banned corporal punishment in schools. In dealing with the matter the 
Constitutional Court did not decide whether corporal punishment was in 
violation of the Bill of Rights, but instead focussed on the right to freedom 
of religion, and subjected the infringement of the right to a limitations 
analysis in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.202 The court came to the 
conclusion that although the parents' right to freedom of religion was being 
violated by the ban on corporal punishment, the limitation was justifiable.203 
Of value, however, for the child victim and child witness is the emphasis 
placed in both S v Williams204 and Christian Education SA v Minister of 
Education205 on the fact that the State has a constitutional obligation to 
protect all people and especially children from maltreatment, abuse or 
degradation. Sachs J in Christian Education SA v Minister of Education 
added that by ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child the State 
undertook to take all appropriate measures to protect the child from 
violence, injury or abuse and stated that one of the reasons for the 
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provisions banning corporal punishment was "to protect the learner from 
physical and emotional abuse".206 
Although the focus of this paper is not on the international protection of child 
witnesses and victims it is perhaps of value in the light of the above dictum 
to consider article 19 of the Convention on the Right of the Child (CRC).207 
It encapsulates the CRC's central and most comprehensive 
conceptualisation of the protection of children against all forms of 
violence.208 In doing so it clearly places a legal obligation on States Parties 
to the CRC to establish measures for the protection of children against all 
forms of violence. Such protective measures should include a range of 
interventions, namely legislative, administrative, social and educational 
measures as well as social programmes of support for the child and the 
child’s caregivers, proactive prevention against the experience of violence 
and maltreatment for those who have been the victims of violence.209 
In its comments on article 19, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the 
Committee) gives recognition to the fact that child victims and witnesses find 
the judicial process particularly onerous.210 The Committee furthermore 
draws special attention to the fact that child victims and witnesses are in 
need of special protection, assistance and support appropriate to their age, 
level of maturity and unique needs in order to prevent possible hardship and 
trauma that may result from their participation in the criminal justice process. 
The Committee fittingly calls on all those involved in the judicial process to 
assist children in all possible ways in the unfortunate situation where those 
children have been the subject of victimisation.211 In this regard the 
Committee emphasises that:212 
 the protection and further development of the child and his or her best 
interests must form the primary purpose of any decision making;  
 children and their parents should be promptly and adequately informed 
of the judicial process; 
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 child victims should be treated in a child-friendly and sensitive manner; 
 judicial involvement should be prevented where possible; and 
 in all proceedings involving child victims, the celerity (speed/haste) 
principle must be applied, while respecting the rule of law. 
Mindful of the aforementioned aspects, child-sensitive measures, such as 
special interview rooms, modified courtrooms, CCTV, limiting the number of 
interviews and protecting the child from being interviewed by the alleged 
perpetrator should be used. All questioning should be conducted in a child-
sensitive manner, for example by using testimonial aids or appointing 
psychological experts such as intermediaries or communicators to assist 
with the questioning of child victims and witnesses.213 
It is accordingly submitted by the writer hereof that, in order to give full 
recognition to the right of child victims and child witnesses not to be 
subjected to neglect, abuse or degradation, it is imperative that all measures 
be taken to provide protection, assistance and support to these children in 
order to prevent possible hardship and trauma that may result from their 
participation in the criminal justice process. 
The abovementioned amendments made to the Criminal Procedure Act214 
that provide for child friendly-measures in the criminal justice system as well 
as the abovementioned jurisprudence that gives recognition to the 
obligation of the State to undertake and implement appropriate measures 
to protect children from harm and or secondary harm is much welcomed, in 
that it demonstrates a progressive commitment by the State and the courts 
to realising a child victim's and witness's constitutional right to security and 
freedom from abuse. 
3.2 The paramountcy of the child's best interests 
The best interests principle was established in South African law in the 
1940s.215 Its influence was, however, previously limited to family law 
proceedings. In emulation of international instruments,216 the application of 
the best interests of the child principle has been expanded to all aspects of 
the law affecting children. In Minister of Welfare and Population 
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Development v Fitzpatrick217 Goldstone J pointed out that section 28(1) is 
not exhaustive of children's rights, but that: 
… section 28(2) requires that the child's best interests have paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child. The plain meaning of the 
words clearly indicates that the reach of section 28(2) cannot be limited to the 
rights enumerated in section 28(1) and section 28(2) must be interpreted to 
extend beyond those provisions. It creates a right that is independent of those 
specified in section 28(1). 
This makes it clear that section 28(2) should not be limited to the rights 
enumerated in section 28(1), but that section 28(2) is a right on its own.218 
It should therefore not be regarded as a mere guideline.219 In addition to 
being an independent right, this right also reinforces other rights.220 The best 
interests principle has furthermore been used to determine the ambit of, as 
well as to limit, other competing rights.221 The Constitutional Court, for 
example in De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions,222 has found that 
although the law banning child pornography limits the applicant's rights to 
privacy and freedom of expression, this limitation is justifiable in view of the 
importance of the purpose of protecting the child's best interests. 
It should be noted, however, that despite the use of the emphatic word 
"paramount" coupled with the far-reaching phrase "in every matter 
concerning the child" in section 28(2), this right does not automatically trump 
all other rights. In De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions223 the 
Constitution held that to say that "s 28(2) of the Constitution 'trumps' other 
provisions of the Bill of Rights … would be alien to the approach adopted by 
this Court that constitutional rights are mutually interrelated and 
interdependent and form a single constitutional value system". The court 
therefore stated that "s 28(2), like the other rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights, is subject to limitations that are reasonable and justifiable in 
compliance with s 36."224 It follows, then, that the fact that the best interests 
of the child are paramount does not mean that they are absolute.225 They 
are capable of limitation by section 36 of the Bill of Rights.226 
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The concept of the best interests of the child has in the past been criticised 
as being inherently indeterminate, providing little guidance to those given 
the task of applying it to matters concerning children.227 This was partly due 
to the absence of a statutory checklist of factors to be taken into account 
when assessing what is in a child's best interests.228 This was accordingly 
included in the Children's Act. Section 7 of the Children's Act sets out a list 
of fourteen factors229 that must, where relevant, be considered by every 
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affect the child's right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with the 
parents or any specific parent on a regular basis; 
(f) the need for the child - 
(i)  to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended family; 
and 
(ii) to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, culture or 
tradition; 
(g) the child's - 
(i) age, maturity and stage of development; 
(ii) gender; 
(iii) background; and 
(iv) any other relevant characteristics of the child; 
(h) the child's physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, 
emotional, social and cultural development; 
(i) any disability that a child may have; 
(j) any chronic illness from which the child may suffer; 
(k) the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family environment and, 
where this is not possible, in an environmental resembling as closely as 
possible a caring family environment; 
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decision maker who applies this principle. Boezaart230 points out that 
regrettably the list provided in the Act is a closed list in that it does not 
provide for "any other factor that may be relevant" as was the case in McCall 
v McCall231 and that this may prove to be a limitation in practice. However, 
she underscores, judicial officers can and should use their judicial discretion 
to consider any other factor where relevant.232 Although no checklist can 
fully eliminate the indeterminate nature of the best interests of the child 
standard, the use of the checklist helps to ensure that relevant 
considerations are taken into account and that the decision-making process 
follows a rational and structured approach. 
In S v M233 the Constitutional Court acknowledged the difficulties with the 
indeterminate nature of the standard of the best interests. Sachs J noted 
that the very expansiveness of the paramountcy principle creates the risk of 
appearing to promise everything in general while actually delivering little in 
particular. The court pointed out, however, that it is precisely this contextual 
nature and inherent flexibility of section 28 that constitutes the source of its 
strength.234 
As stated previously, the best interests principle also plays an important role 
in jurisprudence relating to the testimony of child victims and child witnesses 
in criminal trials. In S v Mokoena235 Judge Bertelsmann declared section 
170A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act to be unconstitutional in that the 
subsection grants a discretion to a court to appoint or not to appoint an 
intermediary when a child witness has to present testimony in a criminal 
trial. Bertelsmann J relied on section 28 of the Constitution, which 
demanded that a child should be exposed to as little stress and mental 
anguish as possible, particularly in the case of a child witness who has been 
the victim of a sexual attack.236 The learned judge noted that it was difficult 
to understand why the legislature should insist that the child victim should 
                                            
(l) the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm that may 
be caused by - 
(i) subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation or 
degradation or exposing the child to violence or exploitation or other 
harmful behaviour; or 
(ii) exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill-treatment, 
violence or harmful behaviour towards another person; 
(m) any family violence involving the child or a family member of the child; and 
(n) which action or decision would avoid or minimise further legal or administrative 
proceedings in relation to the child. 
230  Boezaart "General Principles" 2-8. 
231  McCall v McCall 1994 3 SA 201 (C) 205B-G. 
232  Boezaart "General Principles" 2-8. 
233  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC). 
234  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 23. 
235  S v Mokoena. 
236  S v Mokoena para 78. 
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be exposed to undue stress and suffering before the services of an 
intermediary may be considered. In his view, this threshold provision places 
a limitation upon the best interests of the child that is neither rational nor 
justifiable when weighed up against the legitimate concerns of the accused, 
the court and the public interest. In his view, to demand an extraordinary 
measure of stress or anguish before the assistance of an intermediary can 
be called upon clearly discriminates against the child and is constitutionally 
untenable. In addition, according to him, this section infringes upon the child 
victim's right to equal treatment, dignity and a fair trial.237 
However, in DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development238 
the Constitutional Court refused to confirm the order of invalidity. The 
Constitutional Court dealt with the matter by looking at four interrelated 
questions:239 
  the object of section 170A(1); 
  the proper meaning of the phrase "undue mental stress or suffering"; 
  whether this subsection is capable of being implemented in a manner 
that is consistent with the Constitution;  
  whether this subsection is unconstitutional to the extent that it gives 
discretion to the judicial officer whether or not to appoint an 
intermediary. 
Firstly, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the object of section 170A(1) 
is to protect child complainants in sexual offence cases and other child 
witnesses from undergoing the undue mental stress or suffering that may 
be caused by testifying in court. This object is consistent with the principle 
that the best interests of children are of paramount importance in criminal 
trials involving child witnesses. The court pointed out that section 170A(1) 
recognises the context in which a child complainant testifies in court and 
aims to prevent a child from undergoing undue mental stress or suffering 
while giving testimony by permitting the child to testify through an 
intermediary. Section 170A(1) must therefore be construed so as to give 
effect to this object, namely to protect child complainants from the hardship 
and trauma that may result from their participation in the criminal justice 
system.240 
                                            
237  S v Mokoena paras 79-80. 
238  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 132. 
239  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 92. 
240  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 98. 
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Secondly, with regard to the meaning of the phrase "undue mental stress or 
suffering", the Constitutional Court stressed that, as the phrase is not 
defined, the meaning of the phrase must be understood in the context of the 
objectives of section 170A(1)241 as informed by section 28(2) of the 
Constitution, and the atmosphere in which a child is testifying in court.242 
The court observed that courts have come to accept that the giving of 
evidence in cases involving sexual offences exposes complainants to 
further trauma that may be as severe as the trauma caused by the crime. In 
addition the Constitutional Court pointed out that it is accepted by the court 
that a child complainant in a sexual offence case who testifies without the 
assistance of an intermediary faces a high risk of exposure to undue mental 
stress or suffering. The object of section 170A(1) read with section 170A(3) 
is precisely to prevent this risk of exposure.243 
Thirdly, the Constitutional Court emphasised that this risk of exposure was 
also the reason why, contrary to the reasoning of the High Court, the 
subsection does not require that the child first be exposed to undue mental 
stress or suffering before the provision may be invoked. Such an 
interpretation of the implementation of section 170A(1) would be inimical to 
the objectives of both section 28(2) and section 170A(1) as well as article 
3(1) of the CRC. What subsection 170A(1) contemplates is that the child 
should be assessed prior to testifying in court in order to determine whether 
the services of an intermediary are required. If such an assessment reveals 
that the services of an intermediary are needed, then the State must see to 
it that an application for the appointment of an intermediary in terms of 
section 170A(1) is made before the child testifies.244 
According to the Constitutional Court this procedure should be followed in 
all matters involving child complainants in sexual offence cases and should 
                                            
241  The Constitutional Court in DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development paras 94-97 lists the objectives of s 170A(1) as: 
 aiming to prevent a child from undergoing undue mental stress and suffering 
while giving evidence; 
 recognising the context in which a child witness testifies in court; 
 aiming to reduce to the minimum the degree of stress or mental suffering and 
creating an atmosphere that is conducive for a child to speak freely about the 
events; 
 recognising that children are often intimidated by the court environment, 
especially if they must confront their alleged abuser;  
 recognising the role of an intermediary in fulfilling the objectives. 
242  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 100. 
243  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development paras 108-109. Also see 
the court's description from para 101 onwards of the difficulties experienced by the 
child witness and child victim while testifying. These include multiple interviews, an 
imposing court atmosphere and severe cross-examination. 
244  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development paras 110-112. This is 
precisely what was done in the matter of S v Mokoena. 
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become a standard pre-occupation of our criminal courts dealing with 
complainants in sexual offence cases. In applying the best interests 
principle, judicial officers should therefore consider how the child's rights 
and interests are, or will be, affected if the child complainant in a sexual 
offence case has to testify without the aid of an intermediary. Where the 
prosecutor fails to raise this matter it follows that the judicial officer must, of 
his or her own accord, raise the need for an intermediary to assist the child 
in giving testimony.245 
Furthermore, it should be noted that, according to the Constitutional 
Court,246 the nature of an enquiry into the need for an intermediary is not 
akin to that of a civil trial, which attracts a burden of proof, as was found in 
the case of S v F.247 Rather, it is an enquiry which is conducted in the 
interests of a person (the child) who is not a party to the proceedings but 
who possesses constitutional rights.248 What is required of the judicial officer 
is therefore to consider whether, on the evidence presented to him or her, 
viewed in the light of the objectives of the Constitution and section 170A(1), 
it is in the best interests of the child that an intermediary be appointed.249 
Fourthly, in considering the question whether the discretion given to judicial 
officers to appoint intermediaries renders section 170A(1) unconstitutional, 
Ngcobo J stated that the conferral of a discretion on judicial officers "cannot 
be unconstitutional simply because some judicial officers may exercise the 
discretion incorrectly".250 Ngcobo J emphasised the importance of judicial 
discretion and stated that "what is required is individualised justice, that is, 
justice which is appropriately tailored to the needs of the individual case".251 
Moreover, Ngcobo stated, discretion is a flexible tool which enables judicial 
officers to decide each case on its own merits. In the context of the 
appointment of an intermediary the conferral of judicial discretion 
recognises the existence of a wide range of factors, such as the age, 
gender, disability and level of maturity of a specific child and the nature of 
the offence that could influence the appointment of an intermediary in a 
                                            
245  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development paras 112-113. 
246  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 114. 
247  S v F 1999 1 SACR 571 (C). In the said case, the court equated an enquiry into the 
desirability of appointing an intermediary with a trial in which the State bears the 
burden of proof to establish the need for the appointment of an intermediary on a 
balance of probabilities. 
248  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 114. It is precisely 
for this reason that the need for separate legal representation for the child victim has 
been advocated – see for example Iyer and Ndlovu 2012 Obiter 72. 
249  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 115. 
250  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 119. 
251  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 120. 
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particular case.252 The exercise of this discretion is, however, circumscribed 
in that it must be exercised with due regard to the objective of protecting the 
child from the undue stress or suffering that may arise from testifying in court 
and the principle that the child's best interests are of paramount importance 
in criminal proceedings concerning a sexual offence against a child.253 The 
exercise of this discretion must therefore be so construed as to give effect 
to the aforementioned objective and the principle of the best interests of the 
child. The Constitutional Court therefore intertwines the test of undue mental 
stress or suffering with the best interests test.254 This approach was also 
followed in Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development255 
where Southwood J stated with reference to DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development that "[i]t is clear that the enquiry has a narrow 
focus: to determine whether it is in the best interests of the child that an 
intermediary be appointed." 
The Constitutional Court concluded that, if section 170A(1) fails to meet the 
objective of section 28(2), the fault lies not in the provision itself but in the 
manner in which it is interpreted and implemented. In the words of Ngcobo 
J an incorrect interpretation or implementation of the provision does not 
render it unconstitutional. The solution, according to the Constitutional 
Court, does not lie in making the appointment of an intermediary compulsory 
in every sexual offence case in which a child complainant is involved, but in 
making judicial officers and prosecutors aware of their constitutional 
obligations to ensure that the best interests of children are of paramount 
importance in criminal trials involving child complainants. In this context 
judicial education and the training of prosecutors and other officials who 
deal with victims of sexual offences are of vital importance.256 
Although it may be argued, which argument is supported, that by issuing the 
above-mentioned dictum the Constitutional Court has effectively reduced 
the best interests of the child principle to essentially a matter of statutory 
interpretation,257 the importance of the role of the best interests principle 
                                            
252  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development paras 122-124. Refer also 
to Heaton 2009 JJS 1 for a discussion of an individualised, contextualised and child-
centred determination of the child's best interests. She submits that an 
individualised, contextualised and child-centred determination of the child's best 
interests is one that takes into account the cultural and religious circumstances, 
interests and needs of the individual child. She concludes that all factors that are 
relevant because they have or could have either a negative or positive impact on the 
individual child should be taken into account when assessing a child's best interests. 
253  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development paras 126-128. 
254  Bekink 2014 CARSA 41. 
255  Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2011 2 SACR 109 
(GP) para 7. 
256  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development paras 131-132. 
257  Prinsloo 2012 CARSA 75. 
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and the objective of section 170A(1), namely to prevent children from being 
exposed to undue mental stress or suffering while testifying, have been 
reaffirmed by the Constitutional Court beyond any doubt. 
In Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development258 
Southwood J stated with regard to the inquiry into what is in the best 
interests of the child when deciding on the appointment of an intermediary 
that the inquiry: 
… is not concerned with whether the child is competent to give evidence or 
whether the child's evidence is admissible, credible and reliable. These are 
issues which will arise in the trial and will be decided by the court in the light 
of all the evidence. It is significant that section 170A makes provision for a 
simple procedure for the appointment of an intermediary and essential 
jurisdictional fact: i.e. when it appears to the court that the relevant witness 
would be exposed to undue mental stress and suffering. 
This places an enormous responsibility on the courts and those dealing with 
child victims and child witnesses in the criminal justice system to ensure that 
section 170A is correctly interpreted and implemented, as an incorrect 
interpretation or implementation might result in a child who is in need of 
assistance being left out in the cold. 
It is therefore not surprising that the Constitutional Court's view that section 
170A(1) is not unconstitutional simply because it confers a discretion to 
appoint an intermediary on the courts has been the subject of some 
criticism. Freedman259 points out that the Constitutional Court's reasons for 
rejecting the High Court's view that section 170A(1) is unconstitutional 
because it confers a discretion to appoint an intermediary are not entirely 
convincing, at least in so far as sexual abuse cases are concerned. He 
points out, and rightly so, that while it is true that some child complainants 
may want to confront their abusers, it is very unlikely that the majority of 
child complainants will want to. Given this fact he finds it difficult to 
understand why a right that may be claimed by a small minority of child 
complainants should outweigh the danger that conferring a discretion on the 
court to appoint an intermediary poses for the majority of child complainants. 
He stresses that in this respect it is important to bear in mind that it was the 
High Court that misinterpreted section 170A(1) and diluted the protection it 
confers on child complainants.260 With reference to Schwikkard261 he 
furthermore argues that the flawed approach adopted by the High Court 
towards section 170A(1) appears to have arisen out of a bias in favour of 
                                            
258  Kerkhoff v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2011 2 SACR 109 
(GP) para 7. 
259  Freedman 2010 SACJ 305. 
260  Freedman 2010 SACJ 305. 
261  Schwikkard 1996 Acta Juridica 162. 
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the accused's right to confront and to cross-examine the child witness, and 
it is not entirely clear whether this bias can be overcome through a process 
of judicial education, as the Constitutional Court suggested. In addition, the 
Constitutional Court gives no indication of who should take responsibility for 
developing and implementing such a programme. Freedman points out, and 
rightly so, that the Constitutional Court's suggestion has simply been left 
hanging in the air.262 
Similarly, Matthias and Zaal263 are of the opinion that the High Court's 
approach is preferred for a society in which (as was generally agreed in both 
cases, according to them) the problems of insufficiently motivated and 
sensitised prosecutors and magistrates are extensive. The High Court's 
approach would have compelled prosecutors and magistrates to supply a 
cogent justification for the avoidance of intermediaries. Bertelsmann J 
states that the substantial reason qualification264 in fact creates the flexibility 
which the Constitutional Court holds to be so vital.265 
After considering the aforementioned arguments, the approach of the High 
Court is preferred in that it sets a standard norm for the appointment of 
intermediaries which can be departed from in the event that a child witness 
so wishes or cogent reasons can be found by the presiding judicial officer 
for not appointing an intermediary. This not only simplifies the process while 
allowing for flexibility but in addition ensures a more consistent interpretation 
and implementation of section 170A(1). Both the High Court and the 
Constitutional Court clearly accept as a point of departure the fact that 
testifying as a complainant in a criminal trial is stressful.266 It is therefore 
difficult to imagine how the interests of justice will not be best served by 
allowing for the appointment of an intermediary as a standard norm. 
4  Conclusion 
It is common knowledge that the rights of children have not been adequately 
recognised in the past and that many legal systems have failed to fulfil this 
objective. Prior to the 1980s very few countries in the world recognised 
children's unique characteristics, such as their innocence, naivety, lack of 
maturity, language and cognitive development, in relation to those of adults. 
The need for an individualised approach when dealing with child victims and 
                                            
262  Freedman 2010 SACJ 305. 
263  Matthias and Zaal 2011 Intl J Child Rts 265. 
264  What is required according to this principle is that the appointment of an intermediary 
should be subject to a standard norm which could be departed from only for a good 
reason found and reported. 
265  Matthias and Zaal 2011 Intl J Child Rts 265. 
266  S v Mokoena para 77; DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
para 108. 
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witnesses in the criminal justice system was not acknowledged. The 
emphasis was placed on the child's responsibility as victim and/or witness 
to assist the criminal judicial system, with little attention being afforded to 
the child's needs.267 
This is also true of the child victim and witness in the South African criminal 
justice system. In DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development,268 the Constitutional Court acknowledged that in the past 
South African law did not pay much attention to the anxiety and stress that 
child victims and child witnesses suffered when entering the criminal justice 
system, especially while testifying.269 
Since becoming a democracy in 1994, the South African government has 
committed itself through the Constitution to address and improve the 
situation of children, including that of child victims and witnesses. Owing to 
their particular vulnerability and the difficulties experienced by child victims 
and witnesses when having to testify, it is of immense importance that they 
receive the necessary protection. It is hence heartening to note that the 
evaluation of the constitutional protection of child victims and child 
witnesses in the criminal justice system clearly illustrates that their rights, 
such as the right to dignity, equality, individual autonomy, and freedom from 
violence, and the standard of the paramountcy of the best interest of the 
child, lie at the heart of the Constitution. The evaluation also reflects the 
constitutional obligation of the State and its institutions, including the courts, 
to respect and safeguard these rights. 
The jurisprudence referred to above, such as DPP v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development270 and Centre for Child Law v Media 24 
Limited,271 demonstrates an enlightened and general dedication by the 
courts to realising these rights for child victims and witnesses in real-life 
situations. In this regard the courts can be commended for recognising 
children's' vulnerability and for acknowledging the right of child victims and 
child witnesses not only to be treated with dignity and compassion but also 
to be protected from the hardship and trauma that may result from their 
participation in the criminal justice system.272 The recognition given by the 
courts to the importance of the application of special measures such as 
testifying "in camera"; the prohibition of the publication of information that 
may reveal the identity of the child victim or witness; and especially the 
provision of an intermediary in alleviating undue mental stress or suffering 
                                            
267  Bala 1990 Queen's LJ 3; Van der Merwe "Children as Victims and Witnesses" 563. 
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271  Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited 2018 2 SACR 696 (SCA). 
272  DPP v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development para 108. 
M BEKINK  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  42 
7for the child victim and witness while giving testimony is moreover greatly 
welcomed.273 It is submitted, however, that the appointment of an 
intermediary as a standard norm, as argued above,274 would further 
enhance the protection of child victims and witnesses. 
The application of the best interest principle by the courts in the 
aforementioned judgments resoundingly demonstrates a commitment by 
the courts towards a child-centred and child-sensitive dispensation when 
dealing with child victims and witnesses. The courts can be complemented 
for recognising the inherent worth of children275 and for treating these 
victims and witnesses as individuals with a distinctive personality and not 
merely as miniature adults. By applying and developing the law in such a 
manner, namely one that favours protecting and advancing children's rights, 
recognition is given to "the right [of children] as far as possible to live in a 
secure and nurturing environment free from violence, fear, want and 
avoidable trauma."276 
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